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~~THE HISTORY OF~~  
CONSIDERATIONS  
ON THE  
Management of the Late SECRET  
EXPEDITIONS, &c.

[Price Sixpence.]

~~THE HISTORY OF~~

CONSIDERATIONS

ON THE

MANAGEMENT OF THE STATE SECRET

EXERCISES OF GOV.



[obverse]

CONSIDERATIONS

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# CONSIDERATIONS

ON THE

## MANAGEMENT

OF THE LATE

## SECRET EXPEDITIONS,

AND THE

## CONDUCT of the COURT of France. &

*In a LETTER to \* \* \**

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*Hoc adhuc percommodo cadit, ut cum incredibili ejus audaciâ,  
singularis Stultitia conjuncta est. Nam ut apertus in  
Corripiendis Pecuniis fuit, sic in Spe corrumperi Ju-  
dicii, perspicua sua Consilia conatusque omnibus fecit.*

CICERO in Verrem.

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LONDON:

Printed for W. WEBB, near St. Paul's.

M D C C X L.

[Price Sixpence.]

CONSIDERATIONS

ON THE

MISMANAGEMENT

OF THE STATE

SECRET EDITIONS

AND THE

CONFUSION COURT



ALLEGED

ENDO

Printed for W. W. & J. W. DODGE,

1833.

[Title page]



SIR, I have the honor to be etc.

COMPLAINT and Expostulation are natural to the Injured, even tho' they are conscious they can but little avail them. And to whom can one who shares deeply in the Calamities brought upon his Country, by a long Train of weak Counsels and mistaken Measures, address himself more naturally than to him, thro' whose Influence these Measures were undertaken and pursued? Were this Government now, as formerly, in the Hands of Men differing in their Principles, Views, and Interests, it could not be easy to fix the Charge of a continued Mismanagement upon any particular Person; for when the smallest Wheels that set the Machine of Government a going has an irregular Direction, it is sufficient to confound the noblest Operations; but the Government of Great Britain, Sir, for these twenty Years past, has been moved

by you as its main Spring, and every other subordinate Member has either been discharged or changed if he acted ever so little awry to your Direction. This is so notorious that you have publickly said in a Place where you had Reason to be most on the Reserve, that *he was a pitiful Fellow of a Minister who would suffer any Man in the Government to dispute his Will;* and that you would scorn to have Recourse to the mean Subterfuges of screening yourself bebind the Throne, or pleading your having but a single Voice in the Administration, for you would answer to Parliament for every Measure that was pursued. These two Passages, tho' spoken at different times, sufficiently explain one another. The one shews that you are the only Person to whom all the Miscarriages of Government are owing; and the other, that you can have no Plea in Abatement, because you were counter-acted or overruled.

THE brave A——l V——n was, till within these few Days, thought to be an illustrious Exception to your general Conduct. He was put into Commission tho' he had still opposed your Measures; but the World begins now to penetrate into


into the Mystery, and to think that you sent him to be made a Sacrifice upon the Ocean for the Service he had presumed to do his Country in the S—te. His Conduct and Intrepidity bore him out in two Attempts, by which he raised the sinking Reputation of his Country; but nothing now but a Miracle can rescue him from succumbing to the Storm, which either your Weakness or Wickedness has raised. Either of these in a Minister is destructive to his Country; but unhappy is that Country where the first, the only, Minister is a Compound of both.

FROM the Beginning of our Disputes with Spain you must have been conscious that either a War was unavoidable, or that the Interests of this Country were to be sacrificed. The Inflexibility of the Spanish Court to fulfil even the poor Terms stipulated by the infamous Convention; the Aversion they shewed even to our Sailing in any Part of the *American Seas*, and their unreasonably high Demands upon the *South Sea Company* and our *American Possessions*, were all positive Indications that they never would agree to any Terms of Accommodation unless we beat them into them. It was evident at the same

time that to attack them in *Europe* was both idle and carried but a poor Appearance of Success. As we had a Fleet in the *Mediterranean*, we indeed certainly ought to have given them some Diversion upon the Coast of *Old Spain*; but that never should have been the principal View of the Ministry. It was our pushing a Conquest in the *West Indies* that alone could procure us Satisfaction for past, or any Security against future Injuries; therefore the whole of our Force ought to have been directed against that Quarter. But how, Sir, did you behave? When A—  
V—*n* went from hence, tho' the War was certain and unavoidable, he had no Forces along with him, that without the greatest Fortune and Conduct could have made the Enemy sensible we were in Earnest, while a prodigious Number of useless idle Troops were lying here, to no other apparent Purpose but to over-awe the People and to beggar the Nation.

You cannot, Sir, be unmindful with what Applause his Majesty's Speech at the Opening of the last Session of Parliament was received; it was looked upon as a happy Omen of our future Success, since his Majesty had signified his Resolution that

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that the Enemy should be attacked in the *most sensible Parts.* All Parties concurred in their Approbation of this Measure, and none was found bold enough to oppose the immense Supplies, which were granted, purely from a View that by the *most sensible Parts*, his Majesty meant that the Enemy should be attacked in *America.* It is now ten Months since this Declaration was made to the Nation; but how has it been fulfilled? Can you or your best Friend pretend that it was not in the Power of the Government to send, during these ten Months, the least Supply to Mr. *Vernon?* Can you pretend that there was a Backwardness in the Nation to enter into that Service, or that the least Danger could have arisen to the Kingdom had a proper Supply been sent within that time? No, I dare say you will not pretend but that the new Levies of Marines and Sailors too were compleated with an unexampled Speed and Alacrity: The Nation was ready to support his Majesty with the greatest Spirit and to the utmost of its Power. And no foreign Enemy had either Inclination, Opportunity, or Force sufficient to invade us. With these Advantages what might not have been done? And yet what was done? Upwards of

thirty Sail lay unactive on the Coast without putting to Sea, and our first acting A———l continued on Shore amidst the less dangerous Volleys of Words and Votes in P———t.

THE Marines, which formerly were the Safety of the Fleet and the great Supply of our Sailors when Merchant-Ships were drained of Men for the Service of their Country, were now put upon the same Footing with our Land-Forces, and rendered an Augmentation of the Standing-Army, but have continued for near a twelve Month unactive and unemployed by the Government. I know it has been commonly advanced as an Excuse for this Inactivity, that there are certain Months in which it is extremely improper to transport Men to the *Spanish West Indies*; but that Excuse, if thoroughly examined, will be found groundless and frivolous. For tho' it may be inconvenient at certain Months to transport Men to certain Places in *America*, yet we have abundance of Colonies belonging to ourselves to which they might have been carried at any time without the least Danger, and where they might have remained with less Expence to the Nation than what maintained them

at the *Isle of Wight*, and have thereby been ready, upon every Emergency, to have supported and assisted A———I V———n in whatever he undertook. So easy, so obvious, and so practicable a Measure must in all probability, long before this time, have rendered us Masters not only of *Cartagena*, but the *Havana* itself; and nothing is more demonstrable, than that if Mr. V———n had had a thousand Land-Forces along with him, when he took Fort *Chagre*, he might have rendered himself Master of *Panama*, where he was sure of meeting with a Treasure that would have amply made amends for all the Expences of the War in these Parts.

BUT how miserably has the Nation been deceived in her just Expectations? The Navy remained inactive during all the Season most proper for Action, and while it was impracticable for the Enemy to have opposed her: The Marines lay incamped in a Place where they could not have been of the least Service to the Public, while they might have answered every Purpose of the War had they been employed in that Service which Common Sense, the Ends of raising them, and the Weakness of

of our Enemies, pointed out as the proper Scene of their Action. In the mean time, while we might have been thus usefully and wisely employed, not only our declared Enemies were strengthening themselves by augmenting all their Sea and Land-Forces, but by Means of a sham Neutrality *France* took Occasion first to ruin our Trade, then to fit out a Squadron which could talk to us upon equal Terms; and which, in Conjunction with the Fleet of *Spain*, sailed to the *West Indies*, where they formed a much more powerful Squadron than any we have in these Seas, or than any we shall be able for some Weeks to send thither.

THE Winds and Waves, Sir, are, I know, in the Hands of no Man; but it was easy to have ordered Matters so, that the Reputation, the Safety, and the Interest of the Nation should not depend upon the precarious Chance of either. No Man, who knows ever so little of this Country, is ignorant, that about this time of the Year the Westerly Winds set strongly in upon this Coast; it was likewise easy to foresee, that if the Honour and Interest of the Nation was to depend upon the Sailing of a Fleet out of the Harbours, where

where our Ships were lying, there was, at this Season, more than an equal Chance that both had been ruined. A Government has, before this time, found very important Schemes defeated by the Accidents of Weather; but, I believe, no wise Government ever set the whole of a War, and their most important Operations of every Nature, upon a single Chance, unless when their Affairs were rendered so desperate, that they must otherwise inevitably perish. The Affairs of *Great Britain* were far from being in any such Situation; and the only Difficulty, that the ~~G~~——t has had all along in the Management of this War, seems to have been to restrain the Ardor of the Nation.

BUT that which renders your Conduct, Sir, absolutely inexcusable, is the Nature of the War betwixt us and *Spain*. Had it been a War by which, in its Consequences, *Spain*, our immediate Adversary, alone was to suffer if we were victorious, then some Excuse might have been offered for our *Indolence* against an *Indolent* Enemy. But give me Leave to say, Sir, that your own and your Friends Representations of the Consequences of this War, before it was entered into by the Nation, ought

ought here to have had their Weight. You represented that *France* must inevitably in the Consequences find herself obliged to take Part with *Spain*; but it seems, that tho' this was a good Reason for our not going into War at all, yet it was no Reason why it ought, after gone into, to be pushed with Vigour and Violence. That *France* may find herself affected in the Consequences of our being superior to *Spain* in this War is evident, because if we shall make ourselves Masters of the Keys of the *Spanish* Commerce in the *West Indies*, we render an immense Property, which the *French* have in that Commerce, precarious, and dependant upon our Good-will. Nay, we make ourselves Judges of the Observances of Treaties, by which *France* is precluded from carrying on one Shilling's-worth of Trade in any Bottom sailing to the *Spanish West Indies*. These are Advantages which, should she be stript of, she loses more than she has gained by all the Successes of her Arms, during this and the last Age; his Majesty might at one Blow, that might have been easily and safely struck, have had it in his Power to retrieve all that was sacrificed by the Treaty of *Utrecht*, and the Nation could have retained in her Hands

Hands a Pledge of future Security to her Commerce, the chief Support of her Liberties.

THESE, together with her own Inability to fit out a Fleet all of a sudden that was able to dispute with ours, were Reasons sufficient to determine *France* to endeavour to gain time till she might prepare a Naval Force, that in Conjunction with that of *Spain* might be able, at least, to cope with any one of our Squadrons, and to secure the *Spanish* Possessions in the *West Indies*. But would the Artifices she employed to cover this Design have imposed upon any M——r in *Europe* but yourself? Could any Man be ignorant that it was the Interest of *France* to procrastinate our Preparations, and lull us to put off our Expedition, till she had either found Means to bring about a scandalous Accommodation, or put herself, as near as she could, upon a Footing with our Naval Force?

Not only the Nature of the Quarrel betwixt us and *Spain*, but likewise the positive Declarations, which the Ministers of *France* made from time to time to our Ambassador at that Court, put it out of all

manner of Doubt that the *French* were resolved to look upon themselves as Parties in the War, in case they should find that we were to push it in Earnest. The Conduct of our Fleets in *Europe* gave them no Reason to think that we were. And A——l V——n not being supplied in *America*, very probably, was an Inducement for them to think that his Conduct there was surely disapproved of by the Ministry here. But besides the Declarations made to the Court of *France* by the Earl of *Waldegrave*, the *French* were so far from making a Secret of their Resolutions to support *Spain*, that it broke out upon every Application made by *Spain* to engage them to take Part with her in the present War, and our News-Papers were every Week filled with the Assurances of his most Christian Majesty, that he would support the Crown of *Spain*, as soon as he should find that the Navigation and Commerce of the two Nations in the *West Indies* were to be affected. What they mean by that Expression may be easily understood, when we consider that the making ourselves Masters of any Place of Importance in the *Spanish West Indies* must not only affect, but totally destroy all the Commerce which *France*, contrary

to

to Stipulations, carry on there. If we therefore reflect duly upon this Language of the Court of *France*, we shall find that it contains no more than this: " While " *Britain* continues to carry on the War " in the manner she does, You, the *Spaniards*, are in no manner of Danger; " the only Sufferer will be *Great Britain*, " by the prodigious Armaments which " she is obliged to maintain. Have therefore but a little Patience, and she will " in two Years more, of a War thus managed, play your Game; she is already " over-run with Debts, and two Years of " such Expence as the present will finish her Credit, ruin her Trade, and " beggar her Subjects. Besides, if we " should declare for you, we do both ourselves and you a very great Diskindness; " ourselves, because by Means of our " Neutrality, we have been very great " Gainers in Point of Commerce; and " you, by your being deprived of the " Assistance which, by Means of this " Neutrality, we are now enabled to " afford you. But if we shall find that " that M——y shall open their Eyes to " the Interest of their Country, by doing " what must be of the greatest Benefit to " themselves, and of the utmost Prejudice

" to

" to us, then we will strike in, and to  
 " convince you of our Readiness to assist  
 " you, we will, under-hand, make all the  
 " Preparations possible to be in a Condi-  
 " tion to defeat their Attempts in the  
 " *West Indies*, in case they should make  
 " any."

SUCH, I say, was plainly the Lan-  
 guage of the Court of *France* to that of  
*Spain*; it was a Language which Com-  
 mon Sense and repeated Experience dic-  
 tated; and *Spain* had all the Reason in  
 the World to be satisfied, as she daily, by  
 means of a few pitiful Privateers, crowded  
 her own Harbours with Prizes made of  
 our Ships in Sight of, and almost under  
 the Cannon of, perhaps, the finest Fleet  
 this Nation ever saw.

ANOTHER Circumstance, by which it  
 was impossible to mistake the Designs of  
*France*, was the Conduct of her Ministers  
 with Regard to the States General. No-  
 body, I believe, is ignorant of the great  
 Ascendant which the Court of *France* has  
 gained in the Counsels of that People;  
 yet we find she can without Jealousy,  
 nay perhaps with Pleasure, see the Aug-  
 mentation which we have long sollicited  
 take

take Place. Nay, we were told, immediately before it was agreed to, that it was at the *Request of the Cardinal himself*. How shallow therefore must those Politicians be, who looked upon that Augmentation as a Point gained by *Great Britain*. Whereas *France*, during the whole of this War, has again and again repeated to the States that she will be neutral, in case the *English* shall confine the Scene of War to *Europe*; but when she perceives it was to be extended to *America*, she tells the *Dutch* that their Interests as well as hers were at Stake; and that it would be very agreeable to her if they, in imitation of her, would augment their Forces, in order to be in Readiness to check the Progress of the *British* Arms, in case they should attempt a Conquest in the *West Indies*. I am far from affirming that the Resolution taken by our good Allies, the *Dutch*, was with this View; I only say, that we have no Reason to boast that it was in consequence of our Influence in their Counsels, since we find that it was not only not opposed, but even allowed, and in some measure solicited by the *French*: And it must, indeed, be owned, that nothing but the insufferable Injuries which the Nation has received from

from *Spain* could justify the Policy of undertaking any Conquest against her in the *Indies*, because there is no manner of Doubt, but that every Nation in *Europe* would be much better pleased to see the Trade of their *West Indies* in the Hands of the *Spaniards*, than in those of a more active, industrious People, who might engross the Advantages arising from it to themselves. For this Reason our own Power, and the vigorous Exer-  
tion of it, was all that was left us to sup-  
port ourselves; and had our Power been  
vigorously exerted, we might have struck  
the Blow, while all *Europe* must have  
been contented with being the silent  
Spectators.

THERE is however one Consideration that takes extremely with your Friends, but which every wise Minister will care-  
fully avoid; I mean that the *Secret Ex-  
pedition* is designed not only to make us  
Master of the *Trade*, but also of the  
*Treasures of Spain*, by seizing their *Mines*.  
I say, every wise Minister will care-  
fully avoid this Measure, because *Spain*  
herself is a fatal Instance of the Effects  
which a Heap of unactive Wealth has  
upon a People; and by its supplying the  
Place

Place of all other Commodities without putting the Owners to any Expence of Industry, that that People became feeble and lazy, and the Consequence was an utter Disregard for Commerce and the Manufactures, which before the Discovery of *America* rendered *Spain* famous. Besides, the Possession of these Mines must be ruinous to the Liberties of this Nation; as it would supply to every ambitious Minister the means of Corruption, without being ty'd down to the tedious Formalities of being supply'd by P——t. It is therefore sufficient for the Purpose of *Great Britain* if we are Masters of the *Spanish* Commerce in those Parts; which we might have been some time ago at a cheap and easy Rate. But now it must cost us a greater Expence in Men, Money, Shipping, and Time.

THE People of *England* therefore, *Sir*, expected no more than what their Wrongs entitled them to, when they expected, at least, to be put in Possession of some important Place in the *Spanish West Indies*, which might be a future Check upon that perfidious People, and prevent the wanton Breach of the most solemn Treaties. They had long born with the Barbarities

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and Insults of *Spain*; they endeavoured to do themselves Justice by applying to Parliament; the Parliament referred it to the Ministry to obtain Satisfaction; the Ministry trusted to Treaties, Pacifications, Preliminaries, and Conventions, which they renewed Day by Day, and which all proved no stronger than Shreds of Paper would to bind a ravenous Wolf. *Spain* broke them as soon as her Conveniency, or Advantage, pushed her on; and *Britain* was ready to renew them as soon as her M——r gave the Word. What could the People of *England*, in this Situation, expect, but that longer treating must infallibly ruin their Liberties and Commerce, which, happily for them, were both preserved by the Haughtiness and Perfidy of the *Spaniards*, in not deigning to treat with us upon the Foot of one independant People with another; by refusing to hearken to all Terms of Accommodation, and disregarding even the scandalous Stipulations we had agreed to by the Convention? Being thus forced to have Recourse to Arms, the Mask was thrown off, and you, Sir, was known to retire to the Country upon the first vigorous Measure proposed and pursued. The Management of the War, since, has been such as has swelled

swelled the Expences to a Sum that it is not in the Power of *Spain* to refund. His Majesty and the Nation, therefore, are in a manner necessitated to insist upon a *real* Security, not only for the future Preservation of our Commerce, and for the Satisfaction of the Losses our Merchants sustained before the Convention was concluded, but for the necessary Expences which the Obsturacy of *Spain* has occasioned to the Public. This Security cannot be *real* unless we have the Pledge in our own Hand; for tho' the Court of *Spain* were willing and sincere in a Treaty, by which she shall engage to repay us above Damages, yet she is unable to do it.

EVERY Body knows how much his Catholic Majesty is straitened for Money upon the least Disappointment of the Return of his Galleons from *America*; and how much his Revenues are always anticipated, even when they do regularly return. We have seen several Instances, since the Commencement of this War, wherein he has been obliged to have Recourse to private Purses for defraying the Charges of it, tho' they cannot have been one Third of what this Nation has been

at. Therefore we may certainly affirm, that it is absolutely impossible for us to come out of the present War, into either Honour, Reputation, or Advantage, unless we force the Crown of *Spain* to put into our Hands a Place that shall curb her future Insolence, and be of such Importance, as to reimburse us for the Expences we have been at: Such a Pledge would give us a fair Opportunity of removing the Jealousy of the other Powers of *Europe*, who suspect that our vast Preparations have been made with a Design to overthrow the whole *Spanish* Monarchy. For by the moderate Use we shall make of our Possession, we may shew them that it was not out of a Wantonness of Strength, or a Frenzy of Ambition, that we made War, but to do a Piece of common Justice to a long opprest, long insulted and injured Nation. The World is, by this time, fully sensible, I believe, what Place in the *Spanish West Indies* would have been fittest for our Purpose; and it is certain to Demonstration, that had we attacked it in time, we might have not only over-awed *Spain*, but every other Power that either openly or secretly abetts her.

BUT

BUT if we are to judge by the Rules of Probability or Common Fame, the Opportunity is now snatched out of our Hands, at least the Enterprize is rendered infinitely more difficult than it must have been some time ago; for the Declarations repeated by *France* both to our Ministers and to other Powers, leave us no room to doubt that they intend to cover both that and every other Place belonging to *Spain* in the *West Indies* from any Attempts we shall make. The affected Neutrality which she puts on with Regard to the Operations of the War in *Europe* is, as I observed before, in Consequence of that Indifference with which she can behold every Success on our Part in any other Place but *America*. At the same time her Pretence of acting in Consequence of the Treaty of *Utrecht*, is but a Blind to amuse the Public; for by that Treaty she is equally obliged to guarantee the *Spanish Possessions in Europe* as in *America*.

BUT that which heightens the Infidelity of the Declarations made by that Court, is the Concern which they would take in bringing home the *Spanish Galleons to Europe*. This of itself, were we at

at Peace with *Spain*, is a sufficient Handle for a Rupture with *France*, since, if the Treaty of *Utrecht* only is to be appealed to, it is plain, the *French* are bound up from sending one Ship into these Seas, or to have one Shilling of Concern in that Trade. While we were at Peace with *Spain* indeed, mutual Conveniency begat a mutual Connivance both in us and the *French*, to wink at any Infractions of this Nature. But now that the Conveniency can be no longer mutual, we have all the Reason in the World to insist upon the most rigid Observation of Treaties, and, if we can, without Regard to any under-hand Dealings, to any seperate Connivance (for all the Trade can be no other) betwixt *France* and *Spain*, to seize their Treasures under whatever Convoy they appear, or in whatever Bottoms they are carried, since the very taking them on board by the *French*, or any other Nation whatsoever, is a direct Violation of Treaties, and aggravated at this Juncture, by covering our Enemies in these Places where only they are vulnerable.

THEREFORE, Sir, it appears very plain that the *French* Fleet having on board, or having under their Convoy, any Part of the

the Spanish Treasure or Effects in America, is very different from the same Case happening in Europe. In Europe, a Ship belonging to a neutral Power can protect the Effects of the Enemy, and a certain Time is allowed by all Treaties, according to the Distances of the respective Seas and Ports from the Place where the War was first declared, during which the Effects of the Friend or the neutral Power is not confiscable, tho' found on board the Enemy's Bottom. But in America, no Power in Europe, but the Spaniards themselves, except in the case of our South Sea Company, can trade to the Value of a Shilling to the Spanish West Indies by Treaties. Therefore France, by sending a Squadron to these Ports, in order to bring home either their Galleons or their Treasure, becomes the Aggressor, especially if she publickly avows that it is in order to protect the Concern which she has in the Galleons. This, I say, takes from that Power all Pretences of a Neutrality, and from us all Pretexts of a further Forbearance to look upon them as Enemies.

I SHALL trouble you, Sir, but with a very few more Considerations on this Head. As it was evident to Common Sense

Sense that we ought all along to have expected that *France* would have acted in the manner she has done, so it is likewise evident, that nothing but the Opinion, which the *French* have had of your A\_\_\_\_\_n, could induce a People who understand their own Interest so well as they do, to give us so fair an Opportunity of wounding both *Spain* and her in the most sensible Parts. Had it not been from a confirmed Opinion that the War would be weakly and unactively carried on, every Maxim of Policy and Prudence dictated to *France* that she ought openly to have taken the Step she has said since to have taken, as soon as she was sensible that the War was become unavoidable; had she thought that we were under a wise and vigorous Administration, she must naturally have concluded that we would bend the whole of our Force to give a decisive Blow in the *Spanish West Indies*. The *French*, Sir, I say, upon their own Principles, were inexcusable in their Conduct, if they thought we were in Earnest, and unless they had either positive Assurances or well-grounded Reasons for thinking that the War on our Part would be but a Farce and a Mockery.

THE

THE Force sent out with A——n could give them no Jealousy that he could be able to execute such an Enterprise; he indeed did more than could have been expected perhaps either from his Force or Orders; but still what he did was not *decisive*, and perhaps they thought nothing but the Voice of the People, and the Voice of the Parliament, could have prevented you from shewing your Dislike to his Proceeding.

BEFORE I close this Letter, Sir, I cannot miss taking Notice of another Secret Expedition, I mean that which is now in the most Forwardness, because out of the Reach of Counter-Orders, that under Mr. A——n. I shall be far from affirming that the Notion which is commonly entertained about that Expedition, of its being designed for the *South Sea*, is well grounded, because it is the Opinion of very good Judges, that he has too small a Force to make himself Master of any Place in that Part of the World; and therefore all that he can do is to destroy either the *Pbillipean Islands* or the *Acapulcoa* Ships: Both these, it is thought, would be very prejudicial to *Great Britain*. The *Pbillipean Islands* are so far

from being any Advantage to the Crown of *Spain*, that they cost it about a hundred thousand Pound a Year to keep them up: And to destroy the *Acapulcoa* Ships would be hurting our *East India* Trade, since it is certain that the Benefits which that Company and other Subjects of *Britain* receive from their taking *East India* Commodities at a very dear Rate, is greater than any Advantages that can arise to the Nation from a few private Sailors or Officers being enriched.

I shall end this Letter, Sir, with observing, that as the Public has very good Reason to interest itself in every Event of the War, so it has gloriously distinguish'd the brave Admiral, who has acted with Success and Vigour, by an universal approbation. But from the same Reason the People of *England* expect to see exemplary Justice done upon those, if there are any such, who from a Series of weak and pusillanimous Conduct have afforded the Enemies of the Nation Matter of Scorn and Triumph. The Reputation of the *English* Arms by Sea is of the last Consequence to her Interests; if that is blasted it requires a great Expence of Blood and Treasure to establish it; but when that

that flourishes, her Enemies will never dare wantonly to provoke her Power. That they have done so is plain and confessed by you and your best Friends; whether you and your Counsels have contributed to the mean Opinion they entertain of our Arms, may at a proper Time be a fit Subject of Enquiry.

BUT, Sir, nothing can contribute more to screen you from Suspicion, than by your endeavouring all that you can to enquire into the dark Practices of *little Rogues*, Fellows who act at Second-hand, and who, it is plain, have been the means of discouraging a great Part of our Sailors from entering into his Majesty's Service, by the oppressive villainous Methods they have taken to defraud them. It is likewise to be reasonably hoped that Authors of the Loss and Disgrace which the *English* Arms received, at the Beginning of this War, before a petty Fort in *America*, will be proper to be enquired after. That Repulse, where Victory seemed by all the Accounts we have of the Action to court our Arms, and that too without being attended with Danger, must have been of the worst Consequence to the Reputation of our Arms in these Parts. If a Consideration

tion of the grossest Mismanagements shall pass not only unobserved but uncensured, the World will then know to whom they are owing.


I SHALL conclude with my earnest Wishes that the Effects of all our Mismanagements, both by Sea and Land, may be confined to their Authors, and never extend to alienate the Affections of the People of *England* from any of those Supports or Measures, which their Ancestors thought necessary for the Security of their Liberties.

15 MR 63

I am,

Yours, &c.







## POSTSCRIPT.

**I**T is now about Three Months since I first published this Pamphlet, and the many Thousands of them that have been sold, are a sufficient Answer to the Objections that have been made against it. For, as it has fallen into the Hands of such Variety of Readers, the most Knowing and Acute, as well as the Ignorant and Inattentive, and yet the more it has been read, the more it has been approv'd; This is the biggest presumptive Argument that the Facts are true, in the generat, and the Reasonings from them conclusive. But it may not be improper to take some short Notice of what has been said by Friends and Enemies in Diminution of it.

SOME were fond of making Exceptions, not out of any wicked Design, but only to shew their Penetration and Judgment. Of this Impertinent Kind have I met with several, in Coffee-Houses and Clubs, who, from mere Vanity, have depreiated a Work while they were commanding it, and thrown cold Water upon a Design, which, at the same Time, they could not but acknowledge to be necessary to the Safety of the Nation. A Conduct not very equitable, with regard to the Good Intention of the Writer, or any ways prudent, with regard to the Success of the Performance; both which Considerations should have induced every honest and grateful Reader to read with Candour, to pass over any little incidental Slips for the Sake of the many Seasonable, Important Truths advanced in it; and, instead of lessening its Credit and obstructing its Influence because they think it not a perfect Piece, to recommend and forward it because they own it to be right in the main, and such as may be the Means of doing Good Service in This Time of Danger. I should think, also, that common Modesty should be a reasonable Motive to distrust in all Cases that are not very clear, forasmuch as it may commonly be supposed

posed that an Author, writing upon a Subject so little understood, and where he might expect so much Opposition, has taken care to be a better Master of it than a Person who, perhaps, never thought of it before, and passes Judgment extempore. One of my Friends, not knowing me to be the Author of it, said handsome Things of my Performance, and told me, he would have dispersed many of them at his own Expence, but for two palpable Mistakes in it. Whether they were the Mistakes of the Writer, or the Critic, is not a Straw's Matter, since they did not relate to the Affair of the Wool, which he believed to be so true that it must be the Ruin of the Kingdom. Strange! that a Person of the most upright Intention, and a good Understanding, should Judge and Act so Irrationally! What Discouragements are these Instances to such as are willing to write in the Service of their King and Country! Equally absurd are those who are in such violent Pain for fear the Calculations should be set too high, when they are convinced that they are, in fact, high enough to Ruin us. In Calculations of this Nature it is absolutely impossible to be perfectly accurate, because the Facts, upon which they are grounded, can not be exactly ascertain'd, tho' the oftener and the more I think of them, the more I am convinced that they are set rather too low, than too high. Who can say, to a few Packs, how many Packs of Wool are growing yearly in Great Britain and Ireland? Or, to a small Number, how many Labourers in the Woollen Manufacturies, in Good Times, would Employ? And yet, of both we know enough to be assur'd, that if France manufactures our Wool for us, and we lose the Trade, as we actually have done, We must become Beggars, and the French our Masters. I defy all Mankind to disprove this. But, to do the French Tools Justice, they have too much Sense to attempt it, tho' call'd upon, tho' provok'd, tho' ready to do it, if they could. That our Trade is gone, and that France has got it, by the Means of our Wool, even the Gazetteer will not offer to deny; and, I presume, a Fact must be notorious which that Writer is ashame'd to deny, when the Denial of it would serve his Purpose. On the contrary, since he cannot any longer brazen the Nation out of their Senses, and make them believe they are in as flourishing a Condition as ever, he lately had the Impudence and Folly to Insult the City of London on account of its Decay.—What the Advocates for France think it proper now to insist upon is, the Impracticableness of Mr. Webber's Scheme in particular, and the Impossibility of preventing it by any Scheme whatsoever. — Neither of these Objections are any great Compliment to the King and his Privy Council, because his Majesty, by and with their Advice, accepted Mr. Webber's Scheme as a practicable One, and order'd a Charter to be form'd for that Purpose. The Offers that were made him for the Method by which he purposed to bring in so many Millions from Foreigners, by the Means of his Scheme, are another plain

plain Confutation of those Pretences. For, if the Ministry had been of Opinion that it was Impossible to prevent the Exportation of our Wool, or that Mr. Webber's Scheme would not do it, is it possible to suppose that Men, not as much disengaged as the French Advocates have represented Mr. Webber to be, should offer to purchase it? It is difficult to say which is greatest, the Extravagancy of those who can attempt to impose upon the Nation by such Stuff, or the Folly of those well-meaning Dupes who repeat it after them. If it be impossible to prevent the Exportation of our Wool, we need go no farther, for the Reason of it, than to one of the Facts, related in the Narrative. Mr. Webber, the Reader may remember, carried a Letter (which he received from France, and which gave an Account that the FRENCH, by AGREEMENT, were to have as much of our Wool as they would) to the Secretary of State's Office; who, instead of communicating the Letter to the King and Council, only told Mr. Webber, that

WAS ABOVE HIS MATCH. Though the Secretary of State did not think the Letter worth Notice, no doubt the Parliament will, and either punish Mr. Webber for publishing such a Falshood, or censure such a Neglect of his Majesty's and the Nation's Interest. No wonder Custom-House Officers should connive at the Destruction of their Country, when a superior Officer passes over such Informations in silence. And, unless there be such an Agreement, I dare pawn my Life upon it, that the Exportation of our Wool may be prevented, and that Mr. Webber's Scheme, of an Universal Registry in Charter, will appear to the Parliament not only practicable, but easy, plain, familiar, and agreeable to our Constitution; so fruitful of beneficial Effects, that, if it be carried into Execution, it will put this Nation in a more flourishing Way than ever it was before. And what Reason have we to think that the Parliament will not immediately enter upon a Consideration of an Affair upon which both the Well-being and the very Being of the Nation depends? If it were possible to suppose (which I never can, or will suppose of his Intentions, however plain I may think the Tendency of his Measures) that a Prime-Minister could mean to give up the Nation and his Master to Foreigners, he could never make it the Interest of our Representatives to do it, any more than he could prevail upon them to sacrifice the publick to their private Advantage. No doubt, French Money, on such an Occasion, would not be wanting, if any of the honourable Members would accept of it; but, can any Bribe make it worth a Wise Man's while to Ruin his Estate, and make himself and Family Slaves, after having so long tasted of the Sweets of Liberty and Plenty? Would a Pension, or a Place, for two or three Years, be a Compensation for perpetual Subjection to Arbitrary Power, perhaps for Banishment, perhaps for worse Persecution? Such a Supposition is as great an Imputation upon the Common-Sense, as

It is upon the Integrity, of that Honourable and Wise Assembly, and to make it, would be the highest Breach of Privilege. I dare answer for it, that a Little Time will open such a Scene of Poverty and Distress, that whatever of our Representatives should venture to oppose an Act to prevent the Exportation of our Wool, or should not show himself forward to procure one, such Conduct would render him more odious to his Constituents than even the Excise Scheme, and put it out of the Power of Bribery, prevalent as it is, to purchase him a Seat in another Parliament; but, I persuade myself, our worthy Members will voluntarily intitle themselves to the Esteem and Favour of their Country by anticipating any Application, and redressing their Grievances before they can have an Opportunity to complain of them. But, if any other Security, besides the Honour and Wisdom of a British House of Commons, were wanting to make us easy and safe, we have the Honour and Wisdom of the most Honourable the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, who will never sit silent while his Majesty, the Welfare of the whole Nation, the whole Protestant Religion, the Liberties of all Europe, are in such Imminent Danger of being swallowed up by the growing Strength of France, but will apprise his Majesty of the dangerous Condition we are in, with the Causes of it, and advise him to take speedy Measures to prevent a General Ruin. If what I have written should contribute any thing towards it, I shall think I have liv'd enough to Glory, after having been an Instrument in the Hands of Providence to serve all those valuable Interests: As I did, before I began the Pamphlet, or the Postscript, humbly beg God's Assistance; so having written them in the best manner I could, I do earnestly beg of him to give Success to Them.

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N. B. Mr. Webber lives in Eure-street, Gravel-Lane, Southwark, and will be ready to appear to answer to any of the Facts, mentioned under his Name; or to satisfy any Persons in any Difficulty concerning his Scheme.

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